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Abstract
The way that we look at images is influenced by social 
context. Previously we demonstrated this phenomenon of 
joint perception. If lone participants believed that an unseen 
other person was also looking at the images they saw, it 
shifted the balance of their gaze between negative and 
positive images. The direction of this shift depended upon 
whether participants  thought that later they would be 
compared against  the other person or would be collaborating 
with  them. Here we examined whether the joint perception is 
caused by beliefs about shared experience (looking at the 
same images) or beliefs about joint action (being engaged in 
the same task with the images). We place our results in the 
context of the emerging field of joint action, and discuss their 
connection to notions of group emotion and situated 
cognition. Such findings reveal  the persuasive and subtle 
effect of social context upon cognitive and perceptual 
processes.
Keywords: vision;  joint  action;  eye movements; social 
cognition, situated cognition 
Introduction
Cognition is enveloped by social context. It is rare that we 
use our cognitive or perceptual faculties outside of the world 
of social influence, what Allport (1954/1979) described as 
the real or imagined presence of other people. Yet in 
cognitive and perceptual laboratories,  we typically place 
participants in experimental quarantine away from the 
confounds of social interaction. The risk of this strategy is 
that we overlook the ways in which cognitive and perceptual 
processes interact with social context.
It is now well demonstrated that social cues such as eye 
contact and gaze direction are attended to in fundamentally 
different ways from non-social stimuli, both in terms of 
higher-level attentional selection (e.g. Birmingham, Bischof 
& Kingstone, 2008a, b, 2009; Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 
2007; Senju & Johnson, 2009) and their different 
neurological subsystems (e.g. Greene et al., 2009; Itier & 
Batty, 2009; Ristic, Friesen & Kingstone, 2002). These 
studies, and many others, show how perceptual processing 
differs for social and non-social stimuli (Cacioppo, Visser & 
Pickett, 2005).
In studies of joint perception, this relationship is turned 
on its head; we keep the stimuli constant and examine how 
different social cues exert an influence on perceptual 
processing. The first demonstration (Richardson, Hoover & 
Ghane, 2008) presented participants with a set of four 
images on screen for eight seconds. On different trials, 
participants either believed that in a cubicle next door 
another participant was looking at the same images,  or that 
the person next door was looking at a set of unrelated 
symbols. In each set of images, there was one picture with a 
negative valence (such as crying child), one with a positive 
valence (a smiling couple) and two neutral images with no 
strong valence. When participants believed that they were 
the only ones currently looking at the images, they looked 
more at the unpleasant ones. When they thought they were 
looking jointly with another,  they looked more at the 
pleasant images. 
Participants in this experiment could not see or interact 
with each other. Yet their gaze was systematically shifted if 
they imagined that another person was looking at the same 
stimuli. There have previously been similar demonstrations 
of the influence of social context on social or affective 
responses, for example, that people will smile and laugh 
more if they imagine that a friend elsewhere is currently 
watching the same comedy clip as themselves (Fridlund, 
1991). However, the joint perception result showed that, on 
a trial-by-trial basis, social context can shape a low level 
perceptual/cognitive process. 
The original experiment was carried out at UC Santa Cruz 
in the US. A replication was soon performed at University 
College London in the UK (Richardson et al., 2009). The 
same pervasive effect of social context was found. Gaze 
patterns shifted in response to joint perception. However, in 
this case, when participants believed that they were looking 
together, they looked more at the negative images. The 
contrasting US and UK data is shown in the top panel of 
Figure 1. What is depicted is the total fixation duration for 
the positive and negative images during joint and alone 
looking.  Each study found a significant interaction between 
picture valence and social context,  and between the two 
experiments there was a significant three way interaction, 
showing that the direction of the effect changed. 
Though there were many differences between the 
laboratories’ set up and the participant populations, we 
hypothesised that an important determinant might be how 
participants construed that task. One criticism of the first 
study was that participants did not know why they were 
looking at the images, and why the person next door was 
(sometimes) doing the same thing. So, in subsequent 
research in London (Richardson et al., 2009), we repeated 
the experiments but told pairs of participants either that we 
would be comparing their picture preferences (comparison 
task), or that they would be collaborating on a memory task 
afterwards (collaboration task). As Figure 2 shows, we 
found a pattern of results that mimicked the US / UK 
differences, and also produced a significant three way 
interaction. People who thought they were being compared 
to each other tended to look at the negative and positive 
images equally in the joint condition, like the US 
participants. People who thought that they were 
collaborating looked more at the negative images in the joint 
condition, like the London participants who did not get task 
instructions. There could be other reasons, of course, why 
the US and UK participants differed, but one plausible 
reason appears to be that in the absence of instructions,  they 
interpreted the task in opposite ways.
These previous studies have shown that gaze patterns can 
by systematically influenced by beliefs about social context, 
and that the direction of this influence is sensitive to 
differences in how participants construe their task. In the 
current experiment, we zoom in to this concept of looking at 
something ‘together’. 
For the joint perception effect to occur, is it enough to 
experience a set of stimuli at the same time as another 
person? Or do participants have to believe that they are 
engaged in the same task as the other person? In this 
experiment, unlike those described above, the participants 
always believed that they were looking at the same images 
as each other. What changed, trial-by-trial, was the task that 
they were doing,  and the task that they believed their partner 
was doing. Inspired by the seminal work on joint action 
(Sebanz, Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006) that we discuss 
below, we predicted that joint perception effects would be 
strongest when participants believed that they were not just 
passively sharing an experience, but acting jointly. 
Methods
Participants
32 University College London students (9 male) participated 
voluntarily or for course credit. Data from 4 participants 
were unusable due to equipment calibration problems.
Note that although we actually ran pairs of participants 
simultaneously in the lab, their experiments were run and 
their data analysed independently from each other. This is 
because participants could not see or interact with each 
other during the experiment.  In effect, they acted as a mute 
social context for each other.
Procedure
Participants provided informed consent and then sat in 
opposite corners of the laboratory with their backs to each 
other, facing their display monitor. They could not see each 
other or each other’s display. A brief 9-point calibration was 
carried out for each,  and then task instructions were 
presented on screen. Two tasks were defined for the 
subjects. In the memory task they had to remember as many 
of the pictures as possible for a later test. In the search task, 
they had to detect a translucent X superimposed on one 
image, and press the mouse button that they held in one 
hand. They were informed that their task could change from 
trial to trial,  but that their partner would always be looking 
at the same pictures as them.
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Figure 1. Results from Richardson, Hoover and Ghane (2008) and Richardson et al. (2009).
Design
At the start of each trial, participants were told their task for 
the upcoming presentation. A large icon at the top of the 
screen showed their task (visual search or memory), and a 
smaller icon below that showed their partner’s task (Figure 
2). They also heard a voice say “You will be [memorising/
searching]. Your partner will be [memorising/searching]”.
Participants then saw one negative, one positive and two 
filler images arrayed randomly in a 2x2 grid (see Figure 2). 
They were presented for eight seconds, during which time 
their gaze was tracked. There was a 1 second interval,  and 
then the instructions for the next trial began.
There were 40 trials. In half the participant was told that 
they were to memorise the stimuli and in half they were told 
that they were searching for an X. Similarly, they were told 
that their partner performed the memory task half the time, 
the search task the other half. These task conditions were 
counterbalanced so that half the time the participant and 
their partner were doing the same task, half a different task. 
On eight trials (spread evenly across conditions), an X 
appeared at a random location on one of the images. 
Stimuli
Images were taken from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS), a set of photographs that have been 
extensively normed on a range of attributes (Lang,  Bradley 
& Cuthbert, 2005). We chose 40 negative items with 
valence ratings from 1.6 to 2.4 and a mean of 2, 40 positive 
items from 7.6 to 8.3 and a mean of 8, and 80 filler items 
from 4.8 to 5.2 and a mean of 5. For each trial,  stimuli were 
chosen at random from these categories.
Apparatus
The stimuli were presented on 19” LCD screen at a distance 
of approximately 60cm. Beneath each display was a 
Bobax3000 remote eye tracker that sampled fixations at 100 
Hz. iMac computers behind a partition presented the stimuli, 
calculated gaze position, and collected the data. 
You 
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Figure 2. Trial schematic
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Figure 3. Looking times showed a significant interaction between valence and whether or not 
the participant’s partner was believed to be doing the same or a different task 
Results
Participants looked more towards the negative images when 
they believed that their partner was doing the same task as 
them, regardless of what the task was. We calculated the 
total amount of time spent looking at the critical negative 
and positive images on trials where there was no X present. 
A 2 (valence: negative/positive) x 2 (own task: memory/
search) x 2 (other’s task: same/different) ANOVA was 
performed, and the means for each cell are displayed in 
Figure 3. There was a significant two way interaction 
between valence and other’s task (F(1,27)=10.08, p=.004). 
Post hoc tests show that the difference between positive and 
negative images was significant when the participants 
believed they were doing the same task (using Tukey’s at 
0.01), but did not reach significance when they were doing a 
different task.  There was also a main effect of valence (F
(1,27)=19.19, p<.0001), but all other main effects and 
interactions were non significant (all Fs <1).
General Discussion
The effects of joint perception do not occur simply when 
someone believes that another person is experiencing the 
same stimuli as themselves. We have shown that it is 
necessary that they believe that the other, unseen person is 
engaged in the same task as themselves. This task could be 
to memorise the pictures, which presumably would engage 
processing something of the meaning of an image, or the 
task could just be to search for a visual feature, which 
requires only superficial processing: regardless, the effect of 
joint perception arises whenever these tasks are believed to 
be done together.  In each case, the effect of this co-
engagement is to fixate the negative images more than the 
positive. Below, we discuss other areas of research that 
throw light on joint perception, and the direction of its 
effects in this situation.
Joint Action
Though the standard cognitive model marginalises social 
context, there have been notable exceptions. Studies of 
situated cognition (Barsalou, Breazeal & Smith, 2007; 
Robbins & Ayded, 2009) show that cognition ‘in the wild’ is 
intimately linked not only to representations of the external 
world, but also to the cognitive processes of others. 
Hutchins (1995) observed the ways that navy navigators 
distribute cognitive processes between themselves by using 
external tools and representations, such as maps and 
notations. 
Recently, experimental methods are starting to reveal the 
mechanisms involved in such joint action (Galantucci & 
Sebanz, 2009; Sebanz, Knoblich & Bekkering,  2006). 
Social context can modulate even the simplest of tasks. For 
example, in a traditional stimulus-response compatibility 
task, participants make a judgment about one stimulus 
property (color) and ignore another stimulus property 
(location). If there is an incompatibility between the 
irrelevant property and the response (such as different 
spatial codes) then reaction times increase (Simon,  1969). 
Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz (2003) divided such a task 
between two people. The participants sat next to each other, 
and each person responded to one colour: in effect,  each 
acting as one of the fingers of a participant in Simon’s 
(1969) experiment. Though each person had only one 
response to execute, they showed an incompatibility effect 
when acting together. There was no incompatibility effect 
when performing the same single response task alone. When 
acting jointly, participants represented their partners’ actions 
as if they were their own.
Joint action effects do not occur if the participant is 
simply sat next to another person (Tsai et al., 2006), or if 
that person’s button pressing actions are not intentional 
(their finger is moved by a mechanical device).  Also, if the 
participant is acting jointly, but with a computer program 
(Tsai et al.,  2008) or a marionette’s wooden hand (Tsai & 
Brass, 2007) there is not a stimulus-response incompatibility 
effect.  Therefore, participants only form representations of 
another when that person’s genuine, intentional actions are 
engaged in the same task.
Our results fill out this picture. We have shown that a 
participant’s perceptual process is changed when they 
believe that another person is co-acting with them: they do 
not have to see the person (c.f. Tsai et al., 2008), and the 
‘actions’  do not have to be overt behaviour. If the participant 
thinks that the other person is memorising or scanning the 
images together with them, then that mutual cognitive 
process will shape their gaze patterns.
Focal Images
The term ‘focal image’  comes from Schelling (1960) who 
found that people were very good at guessing what images 
others would find salient. Schelling realised that everyday 
cases of verbal reference are often ambiguous. We say, 
‘Hand me the fork,’ in the presence of many such items, yet 
listeners unproblematically infer the same referent. For 
example, when presented with a page full of items, such as 
watches from a catalog,  participants agreed with each other 
which one was most likely to be referred to as ‘the 
watch’ (Clark, Schreuder & Buttrick, 1983).
When we enter into any joint activity, such coordination is 
all important (Clark, 1996). When we talk, we implicitly 
agree upon names for novel objects (Clark & Brennan, 
1991), align our spatial reference frames (Schober, 1993), 
use each others’ syntactic structures (Branigan, Pickering & 
Cleland, 2000), sway our bodies in synchrony (Shockley, 
Santana & Fowler, 2003; Condon & Ogston, 1971) and even 
scratch our noses together (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). We 
also coordinate our gaze patterns with each other 
(Richardson & Dale,  2005), taking into account the 
knowledge (Richardson, Dale & Kirkham, 2007) and the 
visual context (Richardson, Dale & Tomlinson, 2009) that 
we share. Perhaps participants in our experiment, 
anticipating a future discussion of the stimuli, attempted to 
coordinate gaze patterns with their partner when they 
believed they were acting jointly. In other words, they 
looked at the pictures they thought another person would 
look at: the focal image.
Responses to Negative Stimuli
Our discussion so far has not touched upon one question: 
why is it that the effect of joint perception is sometimes to 
increase looks to the negative pictures, and sometimes to the 
positive images? It seems plausible that participants who 
thought that they were being compared to each other might 
want to look equally at the positive and negative images, 
since they may feel that ogling a disturbing image might not 
reflect well upon them. However why is it that in the 
collaborative memory task and the joint visual search tasks, 
the participants looking together tend to look at the negative 
images?
We are generally very responsive to unpleasant or 
threatening things.  Negative images are considered more 
potent than equivalently-valenced positive images, so much 
so that when combinations of equivalent positively and 
negatively valenced stimuli are presented simultaneously 
participants rate the overall set as unpleasant (for reviews, 
see Baumeister et al., 2001; Lewicka, Czapinski & Peeters, 
1992; Rozin & Royzman, 2004; Skowronski & Charlston, 
1989). Negative stimuli are likely to receive attention more 
quickly (Norris et al.,  2004, Smith et al., 2003) and for 
longer (Hajcak & Olvet, 2008). But why might this bias 
towards negative images be amplified during joint 
perception?
Emotion and Social Interaction
When people collaborate in groups,  they tend to align with 
the group emotion (Barsade, 1998; Hatfield, Cacioppo & 
Rapson, 1993; Wageman, 1995). That emotion arises from 
the majority’s personal disposition for positive or negative 
mood states (George, 1990). Since, as we’ve seen, negative 
stimuli are usually attended to more by individuals, when 
they cooperate together this would serve to amplify the 
negativity bias (Taylor, 1991). Affect can influence 
behaviour without necessarily having to personally 
experience the emotion (Winkielman, Berridge & Wilbarger, 
2005). In this light,  our joint perception phenomenon could 
be seen as a form of minimal, imagined cooperation that is 
sufficient to produce an alignment of group emotional 
biases.
Conclusion
How we move our eyes is swayed by a belief that others are 
looking at the same scene and thinking the same thing. 
These results broaden the notion of joint action to include 
perceptual processes, unseen collaborators and mental 
actions such as remembering and visual search. They also 
suggest a possible experiment to perform at a poster session. 
Sidle up to another conference attendee gazing over the 
results of an experiment. If our results generalise, a slight 
cough will alert them to your presence, engage their feeling 
of joint perception and perhaps sway their gaze towards 
more negative aspects of the poster, demonstrating that an 
effect of social context can even be found at a cognitive 
science conference.
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